As a former Army officer, I have a blunt warning for this government: a major cyber-attack could cripple Britain’s essential services long before ministers decide the country is ready.
Our enemies will not wait for a spending review to deliver its promises in five or 10 years. We go to war with what we have, not what we hope to have by 2035. Nor should we assume the next devastating attack will begin with missiles, tanks or aircraft.
An assault on the systems that keep our food cold, our payments moving, and our electricity flowing could bring chaos directly into our homes.
Last month’s attack on refrigeration systems across hundreds of French supermarkets demonstrated the physical consequences of digital sabotage. One supermarket executive estimated nationwide losses could reach tens of millions of euros.
Further suspected attacks across Europe have reinforced the warning: a compromised computer system can mean spoiled food and disrupted supplies.
Britain has already experienced the commercial damage. M&S initially estimated that its 2025 cyber-attack would reduce operating profits by £300million before mitigation, insurance and trading actions. Consider the potential consequences if disruption spread across several essential services simultaneously.
The history of cyber warfare is in plain sight. Russian military hackers disrupted Ukraine’s electricity grid in 2015, leaving approximately 230,000 people without power.
The subsequent NotPetya attack, attributed by the British government to Russia’s military, caused an estimated $10 billion in damage worldwide. These were demonstrations of the ability to turn digital access into economic damage and disruption to everyday life.
China presents another serious challenge. Britain’s National Cyber Security Centre has warned that the Chinese state-sponsored Volt Typhoon campaign against American infrastructure could be laying the groundwork for future disruptive and destructive attacks. Access gained in peacetime could become a weapon during a crisis.
Russia’s reconnaissance of undersea cables belongs in the same strategic picture. The government has identified the Russian vessel Yantar as gathering intelligence and mapping underwater infrastructure.
Cyber intrusion and physical interference offer different routes towards threatening the networks on which modern societies depend. None of this establishes responsibility for the supermarket attacks.
Attribution requires evidence, and we should resist assigning blame simply because an incident fits our suspicions. But uncertainty about the next attacker makes preparation more urgent. A hostile state, its proxies or a criminal organisation could cause disruption extending far beyond the original victim.
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Are we prepared? The official assessments offer little comfort. In 2025, the National Audit Office warned that government would miss its target for making critical functions resilient to cyber-attack. The NCSC’s 2026 review says the gap between the threat and our resilience is growing.
In my judgement, Labour is paying lip service to national security and resilience while continuing a decades-long failure to resource our armed forces and civilian authorities adequately.
Successive governments have found it politically easier to prioritise benefits and welfare than to explain why defence and emergency preparedness require sustained expenditure. Responsibility extends across parties, but this government must answer for the decisions it makes now.
Companies have responsibilities too. They must secure their systems, train their staff and maintain credible recovery plans. Nevertheless, when an attack threatens food supplies, electricity, banking or communications, its consequences become a matter of national security.
Ministers cannot leave individual businesses to shoulder a national crisis. Government cannot compensate every company for every failure. It must, however, explain what practical assistance businesses can expect when a commercial incident becomes a threat to essential services.
Who coordinates the response, prioritises technical expertise and keeps supplies moving when several major operators need help together?
These arrangements must be rehearsed under demanding conditions. The test is whether hospitals can continue treating patients, supermarkets can replenish shelves and households can obtain necessities during prolonged disruption. Recovery plans need to work when communications fail, suppliers are affected and staff cannot access their usual systems.
Britain’s intelligence capabilities matter enormously, but detecting an adversary’s intentions and keeping the country functioning are different tasks. We need both, supported by clear responsibilities and resources available before an emergency begins.
We cannot assume we have another five or ten years to get ready. Being prepared by 2035, if we achieve it, is too late a deadline on which to gamble our security. Our enemies may well be working to a different timetable, and they will choose their moment.
Ministers must explain what Britain can withstand today and how quickly essential services could recover. National security cannot stop at the supermarket door.
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