Uzbekistan has become a fascinating crucible of global forces contending for influence in Central Asia. Over the years, this column has predicted the geopolitical emergence of the region and the country – which is now happening in full force. While Washington, Beijing and EU capitals compete with investment deals, Moscow competes with less pliable instruments: gas and nuclear power that underpin Uzbekistan’s growth – and the bare knuckle threat of recurrent hegemony.
This last week Secretary of State Marco Rubio and over 200 American executives attended the C5+1 Ministerial conference in Samarkand, once the crossroads of the Silk Road. China’s premier, Li Qiang, had concluded his visit to Tashkent the day before. Meanwhile, Russia did not need an official visit, its presence is always felt. In a press gaggle at the conference, Secretary Rubio was asked about China’s influence in the region and he replied, “it’s competition, right?” It’s more than that actually: it’s a historic opportunity for Uzbekistan to diversify away from power exerted by the behemoths that bookend and dominate the ‘Stans, namely Russia and China.
Rubio’s visit planted the stars and stripes into this historic trade route. His open pitch was: give American companies a fair shot. The implicit message was, your access to the world no longer needs to go exclusively through Moscow, or indeed Beijing or Tehran. The Uzbeks responded on a handsome scale. American and Uzbek officials announced 54 partner agreements worth $12 billion, spanning transport, energy infrastructure, critical minerals, finance, agriculture and health.
The day before Rubio arrived, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev hosted Chinese Premier Li Qiang and announced that Chinese projects in Uzbekistan were worth nearly $60 billion across more than 6,000 joint ventures. Li’s timing was no coincidence, Beijing was reminding Tashkent that China finances its roads, factories and railways. In 2025, Uzbek-Chinese trade approached $18 billion, compared with roughly $1.7 billion with the United States.
Russia is the power some observers are now discounting. This is probably premature, for now. Despite China being Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, Russia comes in second, trading $13 billion in 2025. Russia also maintains a much closer linguistic and cultural link. Yet the strongest tool in Moscow’s toolbox is energy, through which its position in Uzbekistan is getting stronger, not weaker.
Once a major gas exporter, Uzbekistan produced nearly 58.5 billion cubic meters in 2018, but output fell to 46.7 billion by 2023(), turning the country into a net importer. The decline has continued, with production dropping another 16% in the first eight months of 2026. Russia has filled the gap. Gazprom supplied Uzbekistan with 6.48 billion cubic meters in 2025, 15% more than the previous year. The gas travels through Kazakhstan via the Central Asia–Center pipeline, originally built to carry Central Asian gas north to Russia. Moscow has thus shifted from buyer to supplier, gaining significant geopolitical leverage.
Uzbekistan’s nuclear power also deepens the tie. In June, President Mirziyoyev and President Putin launched construction of Uzbekistan’s first nuclear plant. The plant is being built by Russia’s state-owned Rosatom, tethering Uzbekistan to Russian fuel, parts and engineers for decades to come. President Mirziyoyev has announced two new nuclear plants, and it’s worth watching to see which of the great powers gain the preponderant partnership deals in this race.
A key distinction in approach to the realpolitik game is Russia’s willingness to use corruption, intimidation and violence to protect its share of Uzbekistan’s energy sector and keep the country in its close sphere of influence. One recent example is a series of coordinated attacks on the Stone City Energy 1600 MW power plant project in Surkhandarya region developed jointly by France’s EDF, Germany’s Siemens Energy and Qatar’s Nebras Power ().
Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin viewed this $1.4 bn Western project as a threat to its energy dominance in the country, and its response was swift. In 2025, the Uzbek businessman who assembled this international project was kidnapped in Paris and tortured for two days in southern France by a group of Chechens. Seven alleged organizers of the kidnapping are in custody in France. Several media reports allege that an Uzbek banker with a Chechen passport who married a distant member of the President’s family commissioned the kidnapping.
A few months after the local partner was kidnapped, the Western and Qatari project encountered a series of unexplained administrative obstacles that continue to delay it. Notably, the M25 gas field, intended to supply the Western and Qatari power plant, suffered four explosions at its surface facilities. The field was operated by a Gazprom-owned company. Who benefits from the crime? Moscow, obviously! The gas field shutdown has jeopardized the Western-backed energy project and has increased Uzbekistan’s reliance on Russian gas imports. Fully aware of Russian underhand practices, President Mirziyoyev has promptly transferred management of the field to a Chinese company to expedite repairs.
The Stone City Energy project has also faced legal obstacles. Over the summer, Uzbek authorities opened a criminal investigation into the project and secured an Interpol Red Notice against the consortium’s Uzbek partner who had been kidnapped by Chechens in Paris the year before. Comically, Uzbek officials accusedhim of kidnapping the man who is wanted by the French police for ordering the actual kidnapping. Following what seemed to be a flagrant and shameful misuse of its system, Interpol later removed the Red Notice from its website. Such are the intricacies of the hidden struggles inside Uzbekistan’s elite that the most well-intentioned sometimes get bullied by the most hard-nosed and Russian-backed elements using all forms of intimidation – including the legal system, however temporarily.
As great-power competition intensifies, American and European investors should recognize that doing business in Central Asia can still have a harsh Russian dimension. Not all parties follow the same rules and Western interests should be ready to counter such challenges – there as elsewhere increasingly common these days as the Kremlin feels less constrained. Thus far, Uzbekistan has managed to right the ship of state after attempts by darker forces to hijack power. This column was the first to report on the assassination attempt against a top pro-Western Uzbek official in Tashkent back in October 2024. The column was titled ‘A Failed Assassination Attempt In Uzbekistan As It Faces Elections’. Ultimately, the authorities dealt with that threat successfully.
President Mirziyoyev’s administration has attracted $35 bn in energy investment over the past decade (. At a meeting with global energy companies last week, he sought further investment and announced new initiativesto promote FDI. The attacks by rogue elements on the Stone City Energy project therefore run counter to his agenda.
Mirziyoyev has pursued a pragmatic, multi-vector foreign policy, attracting investment from China, Russia, Europe, the United States and, more recently, the Gulf states. He successfully balanced these relationships and has avoided antagonizing his international partners. However, Moscow was particularly displeased by his signing of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with the European Union in October 2025.
Uzbekistan’s Head of the Presidential Administration, Saida Mirziyoyeva, the president’s eldest daughter, is widely seen as a potential successor when his term ends. Known for her pro-Western outlook, she favors closer ties with the Gulf, Europe and the United States. A central challenge for her will be to ensure that international investors are welcomed in practice, not merely in principle, while confronting domestic rogue actors who damage Uzbekistan’s reputation and international standing.
Regular readers of this column know that I have long argued for a Western embrace of Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular as increasingly critical hubs in the world’s geopolitical balance. I have covered the region for some 30 years and traveled there multiple times. America and Europe must leverage their newly established position in the region, as part of the great power competition, to support the rule of law and the protection of private property to help Uzbeks build a prosperous, flourishing and independent state. A state where Russian and crony elements cannot derail the country’s prosperity.
This article was originally published onForbes.com
